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NOTES
MONTANA'S LAW OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
Traditionally, a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser except to
refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him.' Once this general rule
of nonliability is stated, the rest of the law of trespassers is but a list
of exceptions. 2 The attractive nuisance doctrine is one of these ex-
ceptions and where there exists certain circumstances, it may be invoked
to impose a duty or reasonable care on a landowner where none previously
existed. 3 The purpose of the doctrine is to protect trespassing children
from physical harm caused by a dangerous artificial condition, the risk
of which they cannot appreciate, due to their age and inexperience. 4
The attractive nuisance doctrine first appeared in the United States
in the case of Sioux City and Pac. RR. v. Stout5 with the announcement
of the "turntable doctrine." The trial court 6 instructed the jury that
in order to maintain the action the evidence would have to show:
"That the turntable, in the condition, situation and place where
it then was, was a dangerous machine, one which if unguarded or un-
locked, would be likely to cause injury to children; that if in its
construction and the manner in which it was left it was not danger-
ous in its nature, the defendant was not liable for negligence; that
it was further to consider, whether, situated as was defendant's
property in a small town, somewhat remote from habitations, there
was negligence in not anticipating that injury might occur if it
was left unlocked or unguarded; that if it did not have reason to
anticipate that children would be likely to resort to it, or that they
would be likely to be injured by it if they did resort to it, then there
was no negligence." 7
The jury found for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed, finding the charge an "impartial and intelligent one. "I
Historically, the courts have strongly enforced the right of the land-
owner to use his land in an uninhibited manner. However it has also
been recognized that the privileges of a landowner may be limited when
the use of his land adversely affects others.9 The attractive nuisance
'Driscoll v. Clark, 32 Mont. 172, 80 P. 1 (1905), aff'd on rehearing, 32 Mont. 192,
80 P. 373 (1905); Conway v. Monidah Trust Co., 47 Mont. 269, 132 P. 27 (1913);
Egan v. Montana C. Ry., 24 Mont. 569, 63 P.831 (1901); Beinhorn v. Griswold,
27 Mont. 79, 69 P. 557 (1902); Thompson v. Matusek, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d
1022 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS Section 333 at 183 (1965) states
the rule in a slightly different form: "A possessor of land is not liable to
trespassers for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care."
2W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS Section 58 at 368 (3rd. ed. 1964).
sId.
'PROSSER, supra note 2, Section 59 at 372.
617 Wall. 657, 21 L.Ed. 745 (1873).
623 Fed. Cases 183 (1872).
7Sioux City and Pac. RR. v. Stout, supra note 5.
s
8 d.
9Prosser, supra note 4, "the interest in unrestricted freedom to make use of the land
may be required, within reasonable limits, to give way to the greater social interest
in the safety of the child .... "
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doctrine is, then, an attempt to balance two interests: The traditional
interest in the safety and welfare of children and the burden a land-
owner incurs in making his premises safe to avoid harming a trespassing
child. If the landowner's burden is so slight as to not be unreasonable,
and the risk to trespassing children is high, there would seem to be good
reason to hold a landowner liable for injuries inflicted on trespassing
children. 10 This balancing process employed in the attractive nuisance
doctrine has yielded a morass of inconsistent decisions" in the United
States. The case law among jurisdictions in nearly impossible to reconcile.
In any particular case, only those principles and applications of the doc-
trine which have been approved by a particular jurisdiction should be
relied on.
The attractive nuisance doctrine first appeared in Montana in
1905.12 Recovery will be permitted under the doctrine in Montana when
a defendant breaches the duty to act in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances. This is not a general duty to prevent all forseeable harm,
but arises as an exception to the traditional rule regarding trespassers
when there exists special circumstances which justify imposing a duty
despite the trespasser status of the plaintiff. The special circumstances
which are a prerequisite to recovery in Montana are contained in Section
399 of the Second Restatement of Torts which provides:
"A posessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to
children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon
the land if
(a) the land where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has
reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve
an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the con-
dition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and
the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with
the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate
the danger or otherwise to protect the children.13
A failure of a plaintiff in a Montana court to plead and prove "each
and every element" of Section 339 will preclude recovery. 14
"
0See supra note 2.
uThis state of the law prompted one judge to state: "To review C decisions is
useless and to r,-cuncile them is impossible." Fussleman v. Yellowz 'e Valley
Land and Irrig.iion Co., 53 Mont. 254, 163 P. 475 (1917).
"Driscoll v. Cla, k, supra note 1.
'3Section 339 also contained the following caveat: "The Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether the rule stated in this Section may not apply to natural
conditions of the land."
'Gagnier v. Curran Construction Co., ........................ 433 P.2d 894, 900 (1968).
[Vol. 30
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However Section 339 is not the entirety of attractive nuisance law in
Montana as is evidenced by a statement of the Montana court in Gagnier
v. Curran Construction C0.15
"This court adopted as part of the doctrine the Rest. Of Law,
Torts 2d, Section 339."16
As an additional barrier to recovery, the plaintiff in a Montana
court must be aware of the strong reluctance of the Montana Supreme
Court to impose a duty of reasonable care on a landowner to prevent
injuries to a trespassing child. This reluctance can be seen to operate
independently of the quite adequate protection afforded the landowner
by Section 339.17 As a result, the landowner has seemingly been released
from the duty to act reasonably under the circumstances in many Mon-
tana cases.
A plaintiff in Montana is required then to plead and prove that a
landowner defendant knew or had reason to know both that children
were li, -" to trespass8 and that they were likely to be harmed by an
artificial condition which gave rise to an unreasonable risk.1 The Montana
Supreme Court, in the most recent attractive nuisance case, 20 has af-
firmed the Second Restatement meaning of the words "has reason to
know." Section 12 of the Second Restatement provides:
"The words are used to denote the fact that the actor has
information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of
the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in
question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon
the assumption that such fact exists."
In contrast to the meaning of the words "should know' ',21 Section 339
imposes no affirmative duty on a landowner to search his land either for
trespassing children or for the existence of an unreasonable risk. The
duty to act reasonably arises only after the landowner actually has such
information. 2
2
A plaintiff in the Montana courts must also plead and prove that
'5Gagnier v. Curran Construction, supra note 14.
"°Id. at 900.
"Apparently no such reluctance is manifested by the Montana Court when the
landowner is a public entity. See Gilligan v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 350, 166 P.2d
797 (1946). Attractive Nuisance was discussed in the Gilligan case, but the decision
seems to be a trap for the unwary. The plaintiff in the case was not a trespasser,
the city was found to have an affirmative duty to "keep in touch" with conditions
in its streets and in Gagnier v. Curran Construction Co., supra note 15, the court
found the case "inapplicable unless all elements of Section 339 of the Second
Restatement were pleaded by the plaintiff." But see Knox v. City of Granite Falls,
Minn., 72 N.W.2d 67 (1955).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Section 339 clause (a).
"
9Id. clause (b).
2*Gagnier v. Curran Construction Co., supra note 14.
"RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF TORTS Section 12 (1965),
Supra note 18 comment h.
1968]
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the risk arising from an artificial condition was such that the trespassing
child could not appreciate the danger.23 This element of the attractive
nuisance doctrine is the most difficult to assess. The determination of
whether the child in a particular case realized the danger is not made
by comparisons with the average child. Rather the factual determination
is whether the particular child realized or should have realized the danger
of trespassing or intermeddling with the condition. 24 In Montana, this
question is for the jury25 but such a determination should not increase
landowner liability beyond what would be reasonable under the circum-
stances. If there is a risk which a trespassing child appreciates but never-
theless chooses to encounter, the landowner is not liable for physical harm
caused by the condition of the land. 26 It would also be doubtful that a
Montana landowner could be held liable if a child, because of mental
defect or other infirmity, could not realize risks which would have been
obvious to the average child. A landowner defendant in such a case would
be required to act affirmatively only if he had reason to know both that
such a child was likely to trespass and that the child could not appreciate
normal risks because of his infirmity.2 7
The majority of the attractive nuisance cases in Montana have been
decided on the issue of whether the plaintiff has pleaded and proved
the existence of an unreasonable risk to a trespasssing child. In the de-
ciding of this issue, the Montana Supreme Court has displayed its strong
reluctance to impose a duty or reasonable care on the landowner when
the plaintiff is a trespasser. Montana case law removes entire classes
of conditions from the operation of the attractive nuisance rule without
regard to either the reasonableness of the landowner's conduct or the
high degree of risk to trespassing children. This approach has been
manifested by three rulings of the Montana court: (1) the "allurement"
rule, (2) the "Unusually attractive" rule, and (3) the rule of the Gagnier
case.
The "allurement" rule was made a prerequisite to recovery in Driscoll
v. Clark,28 the first Montana attractive nuisance case. In Driscoll, a
trespassing child was denied recovery for injuries sustained when he was
caught up in an endless chain which transported lumber to the defendant's
mill. The court ruled that in order to recover, the plaintiff was bound
to plead and prove an implied invitation thereby obviating the trespasser
status. The basis for the implied invitation was the alluring and attractive
nature of the dangerous condition causing the child's presence on the
13Supra note 18 clause (c).
ncagnier v. Curran Construction Co., supra note 14 at 900.
mId.
"Supra note 14 comment i.; see also Callahan v..Buttrey Inc. 300 F.2d 901 (1962).
"See O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal.2d 729i 744, 414 P.2d 830, 839 (1966).
Supra note 1.
[Vol. 30
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land. This rule continued to be applied. in later -cases.29 In one case, for
example, a child was denied recovery for injuries sustained in a fall
into an obscured mine shaft, because there was no evidence that the
child was aware of its existence. 30 However, in at least one of the early
cases,3 1 the arbitrary nature of this rule was recognized and it was implicit-
ly overruled in Nichols v. Consolidated Daries of Lake County 32 when the
court stated:
"It is not necessary that the instrumentality be the one attract-
ing them into the building." 33
This question was ultimately settled in a later Montana case 34 which
held that a child trespasser may recover even though he never discovers
the dangerous condition which injures him. Montana law now agrees
with Section 339 of the Second Restatement of Torts on this subject
and in fairness, the Montana court should not be unduly criticized for
utilizing such a rule. Allurement was originally the crucial element of
the attractive nuisance doctrine. Now, however, the words "Attractive
Nuisance" are regarded as a misnomer.
The "unusually attractive" rule was also laid down in the Driscoll
case when the Montana court adopted the reasoning contained in an
opinion of a foreign court. 36  That court held that the attraction of a
child by a dangerous condition could not be made the basis of an implied
invitation if such a condition amounted to a use of the land "As others
normally do throughout the country.''37 This process of exclusion re-
moves from the operation of the attractive nuisance doctrine, all con-
ditions except those which amounted to an extraordinary use of the land.
Only those conditions of the land, which were "unusually calculated
to attract",3 could be made the basis of an implied invitation and hence
the basis for recovery. In later cases, an overturned railway car, 39 a slow
moving train, 40 and a railway terminal and yard41 were deemed as not
being "unusually calculated to attract." This ruling applied solely to
to the nature of condition without regard to the actual attraction of
"Nixon v. Montana W. and S. Ry., 50 Mont. 95, 145 P. 8 (1914): Martin v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 51 Mont. 31, 149 P. 91 (1915); Fussleman v. Yellowstone Valley Land
and Irrigation Co., supra note 11; Conway v. Monidah Trust Co., supra note 1.
"'Conway v. Monidah Trust Co., supra note 1.
"See Gates v. Northern Pac. Ry., 37 Mont. -103, 94 P. 751 (1908).
1125 Mont. 460, 239 P.2d 740, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1216 (1952).
mId. at 742.
34Gagnier v. Curran Construction Co., supia note 14 at 900.
"Supra note 18 comment b.
36San Antonio Ry. v. Morgan, 92 Tex. 98, 46 S.W. 28 (1898).
87Driscoll v. Clark, supra note 1 at 3.
"Id.
"'Gates v. Northern Pac. By., supra note 31.
"'Nixon v. Montana S. and W. By., supra note 29.
"Marin v. Northern Pac. By., supra note 29.
1968]
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children by such a condition. As a result, in the Gates case, 42 the court
decided that even if children were in fact attracted by the overturned
railway car, it was not conclusive that it was an "unusually attractive"
condition."
The "unusually attractive" rule was also overturned by the Mon-
tana court in the Nichols case. 48 In that case, a child who had been play-
ing in and about a grain storage elevator was injured while operating an
unlocked service elevator within the building. The service elevator was
alleged to have been maintained in a defective condition which caused
the supporting rope to break and the rapid descent of the elevator to
ground level. The court ruled the defendant's answer, that the service
elevator was an instrumentality normally used in the grain elevator
business, was not an effective defense. The court reasoned that the in-
stallation of a locking device was only a slight burden to the landowner
in relation to the risk to trespassing children. Insofar as mechanical
instrumentalities on the land are concerned, the Montana law now agrees
with the Second Restatement of Torts' determination of what constitutes
an unreasonable risk. In order to qualify a condition as one giving rise
to such risk, two factors are necessary. First, the risk must be such that
it cannot be understood by a trespassing child.44 Secondly, the risk to
children must be preventable in a manner amounting to slight burden
to the landowner, in relation to the high degree of risk.45 In explaining
this element of unreasonable risk, the Second Restatement provides:
"The public interest in the possessor's free use of his land
for his own purposes, is of great significance. A particular con-
dition is therefore regarded as not involving an unreasonable risk
to trespassing children unless it involves a grave risk to them which
could be obviated without any serious interference with the pos-
sessor's legitimate use of the land."46
Thus if measures taken to safeguard children would materially inter-
fere with the use of the land or its utility to the landowner, the risk to
children will not be considered unreasonable. Quite properly then, the
Nichols court refused to exclude the service elevator from the operation
of the attractive nuisance rule. Because of the absence of any knowledge
of the risk by the child, the court concerned itself with only the burden
the landowner would have incurred in installing a locking device. Upon
finding that this burden was slight in relation to the high degree of
risk to trespassing children, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
alleged facts which amounted to a maintenance of an unreasonable risk
by the defendant.
The rule announced in Ganier v. Curran Construction Co. 47 mani-
-Supra note 31.
"Supra note 32.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS, supra note 18 comment m.
1Id. comment n.
"Id.
"Supra note 14.
[Vol. 30
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fests the continuing reluctance of the Montana court to impose on the
landowner the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. The
defendant in the Gagnier case was engaged in the housebuilding trade
in a populated area. Two children were asphyxiated when the earthen
wall of a waterline trench caved in and buried them. The waterline trench
had been partially refilled but the portion near the foundation of the
house had been left open to facilitate the completion of the foundation.
At the time of the accident, the foundation work had been completed
for several days. Although the Montana court had not previously faced
the problem of an excavation, with regard to the attractive nuisance
doctrine, it elected to rule that:
"Certain instrumentalities in or about buildings under con-
struction are not the type of conditions which can be classified
attractive nuisances. 4
8
This ruling was made after consideration of the case law of several for-
eign jurisdictions which have held that artificial conditions which dupli-
cate natural conditions, familiar to the average child, do not amount
to an unreasonable risk within the law of attractive nuisance. To hold
otherwise, in the view of the Montana court, would impose an unreason-
able duty on a private landowner to guard against harm to trespassing
children. 4  Thus it would seem that this reasoning is an attempt by
the Montana court to recognize both the knowledge of the child and
degree of burden to the landowner as element of an unreasonable risk in
conformity with Section 339 of the Second Restatement of Torts.
The Gagnier rule however is not consistent with the Restatement
reasoning. As previously noted,50 the Gagnier court recognized that
the appreciation of the risk by the child is the most difficult condition
to assess. The question of whether the particular child should have
realized the risk is, in the words of the court, "for the jury to decide. '" 51
The court's concern for the rights of landowner and the recognition of
the burdens imposed by a duty to act reasonably probably explain the
Gagnier ruling. This reasoning is an unwarranted extension of the same
reasoning which caused a caveat to be inserted in Section 339 of the
Second Restatement of Torts. That caveat stated that no opinion was
expressed as to whether the section should not also apply to natural
conditions of the land. In explaining the reason for the caveat, the
Second Restatement provides:
"In most instances the burden of improving the land in a state
of nature in order to make is safe for trespassing children would
be disapportionately heavy, and for that reason alone there would
be no liability. ' '52
"Supra note 14 at 899 but see instant case at 901.
OSee text accompanying notes 24 and 25.
Id.
52RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 18 comment p.
1968]
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In the Gagnier case, the preventative measures required to protect chil-
dren would have imposed no such heavy burden. Since the excavation was
a temporary, not permanent condition of the land, and since nothing
remained which would prevent completely refilling the waterline trench,
the preventative measure of filling that trench represented nothing more
that that which the defendant could have and would have performed
as a matter of course. The result of the Gagnier ruling is to again
remove an entire class of conditions from the operation of the attractive
nuisance rule without regard to either the degree of risk to children
or the reasonableness of the landowner's conduct.
There is a more reasonable alternative. California has recently de-
cided a case 51 which reflects the trend in the law of negligence to de-
termine liability as far as possible on the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions without resort to such arbitrary labelizing as "trespasser." In
Crain v. Sestak,54 the particular facts and circumstances closely ap-
proximated those found in the Gagnier case. A fifteen year old boy fell
from a defective scaffolding which was being used in construction of
a house. The California court affirmed a prior decision 55 in which it
was held that a landowner should be held to a standard of reasonable
care as to those conditions from which a child could not be reasonably ex-
pected to protect himself. In the Crain case, the court emphasized,
"Whether or not such an obligation or duty should be imposed
on the possessor depends on the number of variable factors and
the question of liability must be decided in the light of the circum-
stances and not by arbitrarily placing cases in rigid categories
on the basis of the type of condition involved." 56
The California approach represents the more enlightened view in which
the burden of preventative measures is a circumstance considered in
determining the landowner 's liability on the basis of the reasonableness
of his actions. This approach should not increase landowner liability
beyond that which would be reasonable under the circumstances. Thus,
the circumstances in the Crain case were resolved in favor of the de-
fendant landowner.
In view of past decisions, Montana attractive nuisance law reflects
little of the recent trend in the law of negligence. In Montana, the courts
continue to recognize the interests of landowners independently of the
safeguards contained in Section 339 of the Second Restatement of Torts.
Consequently, the landowner has been relieved of the duty to act in a
reasonable manner in attractive nuisance cases involving certain classes
of conditions. Two such classes are: (1) artificial conditions which
duplicate natural conditions in and about buildings under construction,
3Crain v. Cestak, 68 Cal. Rptr. 849, 262 A.C.A. 175 (1968).
611d.
"0 'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, supra note 27.
"Crain v. Sestak, supra note 53 at 853.
[Vol. 30
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and (2) by implication, natural conditions would also be excluded. If
the Gagnier court 57 ruled against recovery, the ruling should have been
clearly based on the theory that the danger created by the condition
was obvious and appreciated by the child rather than an arbitrary and
somewhat inflexible ruling based on the nature of the condition. If the
Gagnier rule should be applied in a future Montana case involving a
condition of the land which duplicates a natural condition, the risk of
which a child cannot appreciate, the necessary result would be a denial
of recovery even if the preventive measures represent only slight burden
to a landowner who fails to act reasonably.
The future of the attractive nuisance doctrine as an action for
recovery based on the breach of the duty to act in a reasonable manner
appears dim in view of the continued reluctance by the Montana court
to impose such a duty on the landowner when the plaintiff is a trespasser.
In future Montana cases involving the attractive nuisance doctrine, the
Montana court should abandon inflexible approaches which unduly favor
the landowner. The burden that a landowner might incur in making
his premises safe to avoid harming a trespassing child should be con-
sidered as one of the circumstances determinative of the reasonableness
of his actions, not as a social evil justifying the complete release of the
landowner from the duty to act reasonably.
WM. P. ROSCOE, III.
57Gagnier v. Curran Construction Co., supra note 14.
1968]
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